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　Part 1:　Introduction
Dawn light shines in through the porthole. We 
awaken while anchored at Aegina Island. Our 50-
foot sloop rolls just enough to show the Temple of 
Aphea Athena ruins as flashes of Doric columns 
against clear blue sky. Scenes framed in the 
rectangular aper ture are like oversaturated 
photographs  f r om a  camera  miracu lous ly 
transmitting images from 500 BC. The boat’s 
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Our Knowledge of the External World as a 
Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy 
(Bertrand Russell, Kindle Loc. 365)
Lawrence Karn ＊ and Takahiko Hattori ＊
Abstract
Our earlier work (School of Social Information Studies, Otsuma Women’s University, No 27, 
2018) examined five approaches to the postmodern debate on how we may think critically across 
a range of ethical questions and aspects. In this article we explore the importance of context in 
how we examine art and history. We begin this paper recollecting a voyage around the Aegean 
and end with a reference to the Sargasso Sea. Both are used as metaphors and our voyage is 
between them. Our inquiry begins with a broad/lateral approach, presenting seven methods 
we may employ in judging art and history; then we more deeply explore two works of literary 
criticism—Alan Sinfield’s “Cultural Materialism, Othello, and the Politics of Plausibility” and 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism”. 
KEY Words and PHRASES : artistic value, judging art and history, historiogaphy, Alan Sinfield, 
feminism, feminist constructions of “otherness”, Frankenstein, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
historical materialism, imperialism, Jane Eyre, literary criticism, Othello, Wide Sargasso Sea.
　＊ School of Social Information Studies, Otsuma Women’s University
87
movements tilt the view from mountaintop to 
hillside to shore to bay and back up again. An 
aroma—fresh coffee—signals us that the captain 
already has our day under way. Now, in the 
moments before leaving the surprising comfort of 
such a confined sleeping ber th and before the 
bustle of sightseeing distracts from deeper 
thoughts, it’s easy to savor the clichés. We are 
appreciating Greece and its islands as the cradle of 
Western Civilization, the earliest chapters in the 
history of Western philosophy, and a repository of 
the arts and culture that has supplied foundational 
ideas to present-day dominant cultures. 
Then, stirring from this reverie, we reflect on 
how much of the panegyric of the narrative of the 
classical Western academy is simply assumed to be 
true and how little critical evaluation we do of it in 
everyday life. The columns of the Temple of Aphea 
Athena [whether they were replicas or not (a point 
to be noted because the friezes of the Parthenon 
are mockups based on the originals safely archived 
in the on-site museum)] are regarded as antiquarian 
treasures. We accept values of worth that have been 
interpolated into our culture; how, nonetheless, can 
we begin to understand that the intuitions we have, 
in which we imagine we are inside our culture, 
are—as suggested in our epigraph from Bertrand 
Russell—as illusory as the mother duck’s supposed 
intuitions about her brood of ducklings?
Now, we will travel from ancient to modern times 
focusing on theorizing art and theorizing history. 
The journey starts with a number of questions. 
These include: Can we judge art? Can we judge 
history? Why does this matter?
　Part 2:　Lateral Thinking
We begin with the matter of how and whether we 
can judge art by critically appraising how Daniel 
Nathan, Thomas Leddy, Eileen John and Alan 
Goldman might serve as our guides. 
　2.1　Starting with Art
In Art, Meaning and the Artist’s Meaning, Daniel 
Nathan opens our discussion with the democratic 
assertion that everyone interprets art for her or 
himself and that “meaning is a process of coming to 
understand the work” (Nathan, 1). Here the process 
of engagement is the key that unlocks meaning. 
Nathan then moves to the debunking of the notion 
that only the intention of the ar tist is to be 
considered in evaluating a work of art, which he 
terms a defense of anti-intentionalism (2). 
Responding  to  cr i t i c i sm o f  c lass ic  ant i -
intentionalism as “reading into” rather that “reading 
from”, Nathan notes there is always an assumption 
of intention and gives an example in the observation 
that “essential to interpretation of ar t is the 
assumption that all features of a painting are there 
on purpose” (6). Nathan, whom we may use as a 
guide to summarize four key points to bear in mind, 
notes that 
i) audiences develop a relationship with the work 
(7), queries 
ii) if there can be art without the intent to create 
art (8), opines that 
iii) art attracts interest in a process of distinct 
contextualization (11), and ends his considerations 
suggesting 
iv) the best strategy as “the one that can make 
the best sense of the greatest number of features 
available” (12) in any work of art.
Thomas Leddy, in Theorizing About Art, contends 
that “the capacity to make essentialist claims is 
important for such practices as teaching art history 
and teaching sculpture, as well as teaching 
aesthetics” (Leddy, 33). He further explains, “This 
will lead me to suggest that philosophy of art and 
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the ar t theor y of ar tists are closely tied” (33). 
Arguing for a sense of context and the essential 
nature of art commentary, Leddy gives the example 
that an “art history lecturer’s statement is going to 
have a dif ferent meaning than the sculpture 
teacher’s statement because of its context … [and 
that in describing sculpture, for example, the] … 
sculpture teacher, the lecturer, and the artist may 
be attempting to accomplish dif ferent things by 
making their statements, but their statements might 
well mean the same things to their hearers” (35). 
Ending with a swipe at reductionism, Leddy 
concludes, “even if reductionism really worked in 
the sciences, it would not necessarily work for other 
theoretical domains. There is no reason to take 
scientific theory to be paradigmatic of theory in 
general in this respect” (40).
Alan Goldman’s contention in There are No 
Aesthetic Principles gets off to a robust start offering 
“an alternative theory that takes over … [the] … 
explanatory role… in regard to aesthetic principles” 
(Goldman, 299). We’re alerted to the conclusion 
that art is a measurement that does not provide a 
measurement for its own measurement in the 
indictment that “the ultimate objects of aesthetic 
evaluation will consist in elements, relations among 
them, and resultant features that differ relevantly in 
each case” (303). Then the argument fails to present 
reasonable alternatives. Notions of “principles 
linking objective properties to goodness in art” 
(304) without any mention of skill, as well as the 
desperate comment that “our intuitive moral 
judgments cannot be captured in a set of rules” 
(311) when Goldman has just explored and rejected 
the unruly reality of art aesthetics, must lead us to 
appreciate Goldman is floundering. Much worse, in 
rejecting a less than absolutely perfect standard we 
are left with no standard at all.
Speaking from the pages of Artistic Value and 
Opportunistic Moralism, Eileen John discusses the 
ar tist’s sensitivity to and relationship with the 
audience in light of the “relation between moral and 
artistic value” (John, 332) embodied in the term 
“oppor tunist ic moralism” (332).  John cites 
fascinating examples, from Jane Austin’s Emma to 
Patricia Highsmith’s The Talented Mr. Ripley, that 
explore this interaction. John ends with a flourish 
that stresses both the intrinsic and instrumental 
value of moral questions in art as a humanizing 
influence and the exhortation (341) that moral 
questions extend the dialogue of what life is about. 
In considering this last point, we may find it 
comfor ting that John “does not r ule out the 
possibility of immoral art being the most valuable 
art” (John, 341). On the other hand, there is some 
ar t that we feel does devalue the value of our 
humanity. This is a subject that would range well 
beyond the space available here.  Only one 
comment, by an artist friend, who forcefully rejects 
“ugly art” as a swindle, will be offered. This leads 
our friend to opine that lazy artists use shock and 
revulsion to con powerful reactions from audiences 
and that truly inspired artists create beauty.
John’s discussion of the humanist critic, who 
“evaluates ar t in terms of its ability to ser ve 
important ethical functions” (341), leads John to the 
somewhat circular conclusion “that moral value is 
valuable in art because people care about moral 
value” (341). Earlier in the article, there were a 
number of examples in which a learning-through-
the-mistakes-of-others theme was presented and it 
was interesting to explore the idea of tasting the 
motivations of others through their turpitude. 
We move on from John with a shaky balance 
between the need for freedom of artistic expression 
and the trust-in-the-goodness-of-humanity vision 
that audiences will increasingly favor works that 
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inspire the highest human aspirations while 
respecting those that cater to the lowest common 
denominator. 
　2.2　Moving from Art to History
A further question—whether we have different 
moral standards when it comes to evaluating art 
versus history—leads us to a consideration of how 
we may theorize about history. Stepping into this 
theoretical boat with Jenkins, Evans, and Friedman, 
let’s see how each of them might captain us in this 
voyage.
Keith Jenkins’ Re-thinking History negotiates very 
rough waters in a consistent and thoughtful analysis 
of the extrapolation of the concept that there is 
always a question in history of not only who tells the 
story, but of why it is being told and what interests 
are served in the telling. His trope of Odysseus is 
one we will extend and employ to say Jenkins is the 
modern day Odysseus when it comes to blinding 
the Cyclops [the notion that there is somewhere 
only one single ocular through which to view what 
really happened in history].
Jenkins dips his oars and churns up the waters 
for the next decade, with such polemic as being 
“optimistic about living in a world ‘without histories’ 
if what passes for history, however imagined, is a 
block to the imagining of things that, in the name of 
emancipation and empowerment, are altogether 
more re levant  and to  the point”  (Jenkins , 
conversation xix). Jenkins surges ahead noting 
“history is one of a series of discourses about the 
world [that] do not create the world … but they do 
appropriate it and give it all the meanings it has” (6) 
and that “Histor y (historiography) is an inter-
textual, linguistic construct” (9). He attacks the 
notion of a Platonic ideal form of the past and 
disabuses us of the vision of “historians trying to 
raise before us the spectre of the real past, an 
objective past about which their accounts are 
accurate and even true. Now I think such certaintist 
[Jenkins’ spelling] claims are not – and never were 
– possible to achieve” (13). Jenkins’ odyssey 
conducts us on a voyage in which the relevant 
question becomes not ‘what is history?’ but ‘who is 
history for?’ (22) and we understand reality as an 
“historically contrived trajectory” in which “power 
relations produce ideological discourses such as 
‘history as knowledge’ which are necessary for all 
involved in terms of conflicting legitimation 
exercises” (23).
In explaining how the work of the historian is 
done, Jenkins informs us that, “To deconstruct 
other peoples’ histories is the precondition of 
constructing your own in ways which suggest you 
know what you are doing; in ways which remind 
you that history is always history for someone” (30). 
He further notes that the 
question then becomes “why?” and the answer is 
because knowledge is related to power and that, 
within social formations, those with the most power 
distribute and legitimate “knowledge” vis-à-vis 
interests as best they can. This is the way out of 
relativism in theory, by analyses of power in practice, 
and thus a relativist perspective need not lead to 
despair but to the beginning of a general recognition 
of how things seem to operate. This is emancipating. 
Reflexively, you too can make histories. (31) 
Jenkins continues that history is
subject to a series of uses and abuses that are 
logically infinite but which in actuality generally 
correspond to a range of power bases that exist at 
any given moment and which str ucture and 
distribute the meanings of histories along a 
dominant-marginal spectrum. (32)           
He concludes that people in the process of 
historiogaphying “ought to make an explicit choice 
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of position” and that opting out is not acceptable.
There is no such thing as an ‘unpositioned centre’ 
(actually a contradiction in terms); no possibility of 
an unpositioned site. The only choice is between a 
history that is aware of what it is doing and a history 
that is not. (82) 
Here, Jenkins makes an excellent point because 
it challenges the nonsense notion that hiding one’s 
position is the same as being objective. 
Moving to Richard J. Evans, Postmodernism and 
History, Evans sails off into waters where he can 
confront the monsters of radical postmodernism. 
His critique of this demon, “roughly speaking the 
idea that language is arbitrarily constructed, and 
represents nothing but itself, so that whenever we 
read something, the meaning we put into it is 
necessarily our own and nobody else’s” (Evans, ¶2) 
is also followed by his caveat that “except of course 
insofar as our own way of reading is part of a wider 
discourse or set of beliefs” (¶2). Here Evans 
acknowledges our process of “meaning creation” is 
an interactive one and this blunts his point about 
radical postmodernism involving a slide toward 
solipsism.
Evans attacks Jenkins on a number of fronts, 
looking for the expediency of saying there really are 
historical truths (which Jenkins would call facts). 
Evans presents examples, ranging from the basic 
[yes, a car is an object and therefore an objective 
reality, but does this example prove the existence of 
objective truth? Maybe the truth of its objective 
reality is obvious.] to the morally necessary [Yes, 
those who falsify history in order to promote neo-
fascist hate propaganda do not have the same 
position of trust as the historiogaphying professors 
at prestigious British institutions.], to argue for 
historical truths.
Evans comments about the car as an object are 
amusing in his distinctions regarding objective and 
subjective reality. However the concept of “objective 
truth” is where interpretation leans toward the 
subjective side. Later, commenting that there are a 
finite number of ways we might read a document or 
view an archeological site unprofitably points out 
there are not infinite ways. While we may say there 
are not infinite ways, the point that a number of 
conflicting and contradictory interpretations are 
possible is enough to show there is no one 
ultimately correct way to interpret a document or 
site. A physical artifact, like a boat rudder, may have 
a set purpose that may be correctly identified. That, 
however, is only the “what is it” question and deeper 
questions of what motivated its construction are 
speculative. 
Evans’ contention, “It is a fundamental premise of 
postmodernist critiques of history that a document 
is re-invented and re-interpreted ever y time 
someone looks at it, so that it can never have any 
fixed meaning at all” (¶10) would be damning if 
true. The point of post-modernists is that they don’t 
want to be absolutist and would more likely say 
each reading or reinterpretation would yield 
additional meanings, depending on the perspective 
of the reader.
To Evans’ assertion in the preceding paragraph, 
Jenkins might argue that there is always an agenda 
in the interpretation of histor y (which he calls 
historiography) and that the closer we examine the 
ideology the better chance we have of exposing the 
parts that were falsified (purposely reported in a 
misleading way to advance the interpreter’s self-
interested point of view).
Evans may charge that Jenkins will run the ship 
aground, will morally bankrupt history’s need for 
historical truths. Evans contends, “If we don’t 
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believe it’s possible to distinguish between truth 
and falsehood, then we have no means of exposing 
racism, anti-Semitism, and neo-fascism as doctrines 
of hate built on an edifice of lies, indeed we have no 
real means of discrediting them at all” (¶14). 
Jenkins’ call for historians to be aware of their role 
in historiography does not say it’s impossible to 
distinguish between truth and falsehood. Rather, in 
fact checking the claims of a holocaust falsifier, 
Jenkins would note, “As the past has gone, no 
account can ever be checked against it but only 
against other accounts” (Jenkins, 14). In this 
respect, the courts ruled that other accounts were 
true and acted accordingly. Evans has a strongly 
hopeful concluding paragraph about the need for 
truth, but it doesn’t prove historical truth. It proves, 
as Jenkins may put it, facts about the past.
Finally, Susan Stanford Friedman’s Making 
History: Reflections on Feminism, Narrative, and 
Desire sets the boat on a more even keel and plots a 
course through the choppy waters in slightly 
reframing Evans notion of historical truth as the 
Real [capitalized to refer to the Lacanian concept of 
the malleability of our knowledge of the external 
world] and in understanding how making history 
by writing histor y as a political act allows for 
marginalized groups to have a real say in the world 
by defining and writing their own histories. 
Friedman distinguishes between history as the past 
and history as stories about the past (Friedman, 
233). She makes the excellent point that the 
“interventionist dimension of history writing tends 
to be unacknowledged or over tly denied, thus 
covertly operative” (233). Further teasing out this 
dynamic, she creates balance between notions of 
how “the excellence of history writing depends not 
on the level of objectivity but rather upon the 
cogency of interpretation” (234) and the “paradigm 
shift” notion of writing about women’s history as a 
political act “to engage in the deformation of 
phallocentric histor y” and a “reformation of 
“women’s experience and the issue of gender” 
(345).
Friedman concludes by endorsing, “two positions 
that are all too often set up as mutually exclusive 
oppositions: [making] history by writing history as 
a political act; and the need to problematize that 
activity so as to avoid the creation of grand 
narratives” (236) and the concluding sentiment we 
are left with is akin to the following extract from 
Jenkins.
Between the Scylla and Charybdis of, on the one 
hand, authorised history and, on the other, post-
modern pastlessness, a space exists for the desirable 
outcome of as many people(s) as possible to make 
their own histories such that they can have real 
effects (a real say) in the world. (Jenkins, 80) 
　2.3　Summarizing by Focusing on Functions
In response to the arguments presented above, 
we contend that we can judge art and we can judge 
history by the purposes they serve. This also leads 
to the question of what functions they should serve. 
We no more have art in a vacuum than we have 
events from the past that we are able to see with 
pristine accuracy and ultimate truth. The singular 
truths of of ficially indorsed versions are myths 
promulgated by those seeking to promote a 
hegemonic interpretation of both art and history. In 
recognizing that all interpretations advance an 
agenda, we are challenged to choose which agenda 
to endorse. 
 
Social justice—in terms of material, legal, 
political, religious, ethnic, gender, sexual orientation 
and the ent ire  range of  human needs and 
expression—is based on equality. By understanding 
this outcome as the function that we wish to see 
served, we have a practical yardstick by which to 
judge theorizing about ar t and histor y. Critical 
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evaluation of current events and world news 
involves judging which dominant power structures, 
institutions and individuals benefit from ongoing 
inequality and how their interpretations of art and 
history maintain this inequality. This engagement is 
a first step in the journey toward remedying this 
inequality. 
　Part 3:　Greater Depth 
We now move to more deeply explore two works 
of literar y criticism—Alan Sinfield’s “Cultural 
Materialism, Othello, and the Politics of Plausibility” 
and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Three Women’s 
Texts  and  a  Cr i t ique  o f  Imper ia l i sm”—in 
appreciating how such critiques illustrate depth of 
critical thinking. This section of our article explores 
the benefits and challenges in literary criticism, and 
the use of historical materialism and feminist 
constructions of “otherness”, in evaluating and 
addressing global inequalities. Such inequalities 
may be revealed through literary interpretation that 
explores the view of non-whites and non-Europeans 
that are expressed in Shakespeare’s works; and of 
the diminished role of women, even in works 
written by women, and the imperialist elements in 
such works. Discussions of key concepts in their 
interpretations are used to advance the argument 
that such methods of interpretation, as employed by 
Sinfield and Spivak—Sinfield’s attention to the 
plausibility of narratives and Spivak’s critique of 
feminist constructions of “otherness”—enable us to 
identify inequalities as sources of injustice and to 
attempt to correct racist, sexist, and colonial 
interpretations of history. In short, that the benefit 
of critical thinking is that it must always have and 
focus on achieving practical and urgently necessary 
goals.
In examining Sinfield and Spivak’s articles, we 
will consider a number ways each advances their 
arguments. What each sets out to do, models they 
present to accomplish these tasks, as well as 
conclusions these models suggest,  and the 
limitations of their approaches will be explored. 
Certainly, each writes with beneficial intent and our 
assessment of the value of their approaches and 
implications is generally positive.  
　3.1　Sinfield and Historical Materialism
Alan Sinfield’s “Cultural Materialism, Othello, and 
the Politics of Plausibility” starts by challenging the 
idea that what you think of yourself is the most 
important aspect of who you are. Sinfield asserts, 
“language and reality are always interactive, 
dependent upon social recognition; reputation is 
only  a  specia l  expl ic i t  instance.  Meaning, 
communication, language work only because they 
are shared” (743). Here, Sinfield is saying that 
social agreement on the status of an individual is 
the prime determinant of identity. Not what 
someone believes about her or his self but what 
society may reasonably believe about her or him is 
the actual standard by which worth is judged.
 
Sinfield contends that, “…conditions of plausibility 
are crucial – they determine which stories will be 
believed” (744). While making this statement in the 
context of the stories presented by the characters in 
Othello, Sinfield is presenting a model for the 
analysis of the ideologies that underlie narratives.
Plausibility, Sinfield explains, is an understanding 
of a dramatic or literary situation’s verisimilitude – 
that presents what may be considered a reasonable 
explanation at the time. Later interpretation of the 
effects the explanation had or was intended to have 
ser ves as a key to identifying the biases and 
prejudices at that time. What we may see—
[through analyzing and extrapolating from a 
fictional work] from looking at what was plausible 
at the time—constitutes a reasonable explanation of 
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the nature and character of that society and the 
vested interests being served or the social concerns 
that ordinar y people were interested in seeing 
redressed. Thus, according to Sinfield, literary 
works may be seen by audiences as valid as 
“historical facts” in giving a true sense of what it 
was like to live then and, by extension, of what 
really was taking place. Whether the work was 
fiction or claiming to be an accurate chronicle of the 
facts, each is a selective process that enables the 
individual who engages with the work to get to the 
“sweet spot” where there is enough information to 
act and not so much that one is thrown into a 
paralysis of intellectual detachment that is 
otherwise known as scholarly objectivity [although 
perhaps “objectivity” may be more usefully defined 
as “a balancing of subjectivities”].
In examining the notion of plausibility at work in 
Othello, Sinfield obser ves that Brabantio feels 
De sde mon a ’ s  l o ve  fo r  O the l lo  “wo u ld  be 
preposterous, an error of nature” (744). Othello 
plays on the preposterous errors of nature with 
glamorous stories of his life in a land where he has 
endured astounding adventures and witnessed 
bizarre realities such as men whose heads grow 
below their  shoulders .  S inf ie ld  notes  th is 
interpretation, by Othello, translates Brabantio’s 
story into a more acceptable form. In a scene from 
David Lean’s 1962 epic, Lawrence Of Arabia, a 
statesman talks to Lawrence about the manipulation 
of truth. The statesman explains, “If we’ve told lies, 
you’ve told half-lies. And a man who tells lies, like 
me, merely hides the truth. But a man who tells 
half-lies has forgotten where he has put it” (2 hrs. 
50 min. 03 sec. to 2 hrs. 50 min. 16 sec.).  Sinfield 
comments on how Iago, mixing Brabantio’s original 
racist lies with fur ther prejudices, manages to 
convince Othello to conceive of himself in the image 
Venetian society has of him. Sinfield approvingly 
quotes Ania Loomba in noting that,          
Othello moves from being a colonized subject 
existing on the terms of white Venetian society and 
tr ying to internalize its ideology, towards being 
marginalized, alienated and outcast from it in every 
way, until he occupies his “true” position as its other. 
(745)
Highlighting the wider context of structural 
injustice, Sinfield argues,  “The racism and sexism 
in the play should not be traced just to Iago’s 
character … or to his arbitrary devilishness, but to 
the Venetian culture that sets the conditions of 
plausibility” (745). Sinfield employs his model of 
interpretation of stories—that plausibility is the sin 
qua non—to the context of the production of 
ideology (745). Sinfield notes,
Literary significance and personal significance seem 
to derive from and speak to individual consciousness. 
But thinking of ourselves as essentially individuals 
tends to efface processes of cultural production and, 
in the same movement, leads us to imagine ourselves 
as autonomous, self-determining. It is not individuals 
but power structures that produce the system within 
we live and think, and focusing upon the individual 
makes it hard to discern those structures; and if we 
discern them, hard to do much about them, since 
that would require collective action. (749)
In the above extract, Sinfield presents two points 
in support of historical materialism. The first is that 
myths of rugged individualism fail to take into 
account power str uctures that have allowed 
particular individuals to appear to singly wield such 
influence. The second is that social change [as 
implied in the word “social”] requires collective 
action rather than unique heroics.
Furthering this interpretation, Sinfield adduces 
that, “Validating the individual may seem attractive 
because it appears to empower him or her, but 
actually it under values potential resources of 
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understanding and resistance” (750). He asserts 
that, “Political awareness does not arise out of an 
essential, individual, self-consciousness of class, 
race, nation, gender or sexual orientation; but from 
involvement in a milieu, a subculture” (749). 
Extending this discussion under the heading of 
Entrapment and Faultlines, Sinfield affirms, “Marx 
was surely right to envisage such collectivities as 
the feasible agents of historical change” (750). 
Sinfield critiques New Historicism as “drawn to 
what I call the ‘entrapment model’ of ideology and 
power, whereby even, or especially, maneuvers that 
seem designed to challenge the system help to 
maintain it” (750). This is a dilemma that is 
presented as being almost self-evident and that 
Sinfield wants to portray as serious and prevalent. 
He quotes Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-
Fashioning in stating the paradox that one can only 
self-fashion within the conventions set for self-
fashioning. There’s a popular adage that declares 
fashion is nothing more than a sprint to see how 
quickly one can conform. While Sinfield concedes 
Greenblatt “has recently denied proposing that 
resistance is always coopted” (751), we are still 
presented with the general trend that “the notion 
that dissonance is characteristically contained has 
caught the imagination of the profession [of new-
historicists]” (751). At first explanation, this New 
Historicist view does appear to be accurate; here, 
however, the plausibility test provides a way to 
challenge the entrapment model. 
Sinfield employs his model of plausibility [as a 
way of explaining the justification for interpreting 
history] to explore ‘faultlines’ in the idea that all 
resistance is coopted. Such possible fractures are 
cases in which there’s a “risk that the legally 
constituted ruler might not be able to control the 
military apparatus” (751). After examining various 
historical and literary military leaders, Sinfield 
restates his position 
that dissident potential derives ultimately not from 
essential qualities in individuals … but from conflict 
and contradiction that the social order inevitably 
produces within itself, even as it attempts to sustain 
itself. Despite their power, dominant ideological 
formations are always, in practice, under pressure, 
striving to substantiate their claim to superior 
plausibility in the face of diverse disturbances. (752) 
The implications of this claim are that there is 
more space for social change than an entrapment 
model allows one to believe. There is also an 
implication that the entrapment model acts as a 
justification for non-action by suggesting acts of 
dissent are useless and counterproductive. Finally, 
the implication is that dominant systems always 
tend toward disintegration because the stress of 
maintaining their superiority produces cracks and 
weaknesses Sinfield refers to as faultlines.
Using this insight to interpret Othello, Sinfield 
asserts that the 
scope for dissident understanding and action occurs 
not because women characters, Shakespeare, and 
feminist readers have a privileged vantage point 
outside the dominant, but because the social order 
cannot but produce faultlines through which its own 
criteria of plausibility fall into contest and disarray. 
(755) 
Using the example of freedom versus heavily 
legislated control of marital choice, Sinfield notes 
that literary issues are interesting when there is a 
tension between personal choices and public policy 
that has the power to question the authority of the 
state. “In these texts, through diverse genres and 
institutions, people were talking to each other about 
an aspect of their lives that they found hard to 
handle” (756). Sinfield reinforces the merits of his 
approach to interpreting literature explaining, “this 
is why it is not unpromising to seek in literature our 
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preoccupations with class, race, gender, and sexual 
orientation: it is likely that literary texts will address 
just such controversial aspects of our ideological 
formation” (756). He also reasserts the importance 
of his plausibility model in declaring that, “the task 
for a political criticism, then, is to observe how 
stories negotiate the faultlines that distress the 
prevailing conditions of plausibility” (756). This 
directly relates to our view that Sinfield’s approach 
to literary criticism furthers the development of an 
inter national ist  perceptive by encouraging 
‘observation of faultlines’ and openness to alternate 
interpretations.
We may ask what findings the use of this 
interpretation suggests. Sinfield quotes Anthony 
Giddens’ observation that, “power relations are 
always two-way; this is to say, however subordinate 
an actor may be in a social relationship, the very 
fact of involvement in that relationship gives him or 
her a certain amount of power over the other” (756). 
We may further ask how the application of this 
model yields these findings and read the response 
that  “even a  text  that  aspires to  contain a 
subordinate perspective must first bring it into 
visibility; even to misrepresent, one must present” 
(757). Sinfield continues that subordinates may not 
conform to the definitions the dominant texts use in 
attempting to subsume them and that “readers do 
not have to respect closures … [and] … can insist 
… a text arouses expectations that exceed the 
closure” (757). In considering the limitations of this 
interpretation, Sinfield must also obser ve that, 
“conversely, a text that aspires to dissidence cannot 
control meaning either” (757). While not ultimately 
exploring a wide range of possibility for the 
emergence of dissenting voices in literary works, 
Sinfield does present the legitimate possibility for 
all texts to be challenged.
Moving to further elucidate the benefits of his 
approach, Sinfield notes, “the implications of these 
arguments for literary criticism are substantial… 
[because] …meaning is not adequately deducible 
from the text-on-the-page. The text is always a site 
of cultural contest, but it is never a self-sufficient 
site” (758). At this stage, cultural materialism is 
suggested as a method that may yield more 
sufficient interpretations of literary works than a 
strict text-on-the-page-only approach. It is a method 
that  a lso requires greater  r igor.  “Cultural 
materialism calls for modes of knowledge that 
literary criticism scarcely possesses … that hitherto 
have been distinctively within that alien other of 
essentialist humanism, Marxism” (758). Sinfield 
cont inues that  quest ions are posed within 
“historiography and epistemology that require 
theor y  mor e  complex  than  the  t idy  pos t -
structuralist formula that everything, after all, is a 
text (or that everything is theater)” (758).
Closing his article, Sinfield observes that, “the 
quintessential traditional critical activity was always 
interpretive, getting the text to make sense” (758). 
Using three examples from Othello—Othello’s 
gullibility, Desdemona’s submissiveness, Iago’s 
wickedness—to illustrate these traits might be 
plausible “because they activate regressive aspects 
of our cultural formation”, Sinfield concludes 
“coherence is a chimera” and that “no story can 
contain all the possibilities it brings into play; 
coherence is a selection” (759). With these 
roadblocks out of the way, Sinfield convincingly 
asserts literary criticism is a subculture with its 
own criteria of plausibility and that the benefit of 
cultural materialism as an approach to interpreting 
literature is a much-needed approach “not just to 
produce different readings but to shift the criteria 
of plausibility” (759). This shift in standard of 
acceptability/reasonableness of explanation/ 
justifiability of actions and situations is beyond 
simply getting the text to make sense and toward the 
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development  o f  a  deeper  perspect ive .  His 
discussions of modes of knowledge that include 
Marxism, historiography and epistemology are 
indicators of Sinfield’s intent that the approach to 
literary interpretation must more incisively address 
global issues. 
We now move to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s 
literar y criticism as a method for exploring 
feminism and imperialism. 
　3.2　Spivak and “Other-denying” Colonialism
In “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of 
Imperialism”, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak sets out 
to
examine the operation of the “worlding” of what is 
today “the Third World” by [an interpretation of] 
what has become a cult text of feminism; Jane Eyre. 
[Spivak says,] I plot the novel’s reach and grasp, and 
locate its structural motors. I read Wide Sargasso Sea 
as Jane Eyre’s reinscription and Frankenstein as an 
analysis—even a deconstruction—of a “worlding” 
such as Jane Eyre’s. (244)
A major structural motor Spivak locates to power 
her interpretation is that “the progress of Jane Eyre 
can be charted through a sequential arrangement 
of the family/counter-family dyad” (246). Spivak 
poses the question, “In terms of the narrative 
energy of the novel, how is Jane moved from the 
place of the counter-family to the family-in-law? [and 
answers that] It is the active ideology of imperialism 
that provides the discursive field” (247). Spivak’s 
term, discursive field, includes
the suggestion that nineteenth-centur y feminist 
individualism could conceive of a “greater” project 
than access to the closed circle of the nuclear family. 
This is the project of soul making beyond “mere” 
sexual reproduction. Here the native “subject” is not 
almost an animal but rather the object of what might 
be ter med the ter ror ism of  the categorical 
imperative. (248)
The categorical imperative’s terrorism is linked 
to its mandate to enlighten the benighted heathen 
world. This act of religious conversion for the sake 
of humanizing, that is clearly a colonizing act, is 
discussed by Spivak as one that, while clearly 
colonizing from a present-day perspective, was not 
an intentionally—not a determinately grounded—
action. She notes that, 
The “categorical” in Kant cannot be adequately 
represented in determinately grounded action. The 
dangerous transformative power of philosophy, 
however, is that its formal subtlety can be travestied 
in the service of the state. Such a travesty in the case 
of the categorical imperative can justify the 
imperialist project by producing the following 
formula: make the heathen into a human so that he 
can be treated as an end in himself. (248) 
Spivak alludes to this designation of heathen as 
non-human in her discussion of Christophine, who 
is a minor character in Jean Rhys’ Wide Sargasso 
Sea and of whom Spivak says, “She cannot be 
contained by a novel which rewrites a canonical 
English text within the European novelistic tradition 
in the interest of the white Creole rather than the 
native” (253). 
We here observe that Spivak’s act of interpreting 
the significance of the Christophine character has 
already taken Christophine beyond the novel. This 
points to the emergence of dissenting voices in 
spite of the novel’s intentions. This observation, 
particularly the phrase “she cannot be contained”, 
echoes Sinfield’s remarks about how interpretation 
steps past the boundaries writers may set for their 
characters. Here and in her interpretation of 
Frankenstein, Spivak’s criticism allows readers to 
develop an internationalist (and/or anti-colonial) 
perspective regardless of the author’s intentions 
and the overt politics of literary texts.         
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On this point we may recall Sinfield’s quotation of 
Anthony Giddens in extending this idea and 
asserting that, “power relations are always two-way; 
this is to say, however subordinate an actor may be 
in a social relationship, the very fact of involvement 
in that relationship gives him or her a cer tain 
amount of power over the other” (Sinfield, 756).
Returning to the second half of her paragraph 
discussing Christophine, Spivak comments, “No 
perspective critical of imperialism can turn the 
Other into a self, because the project of imperialism 
has always already historically refracted what might 
have been the absolutely Other into a domesticated 
Other that consolidates the imperialist self” (253). 
Here Spivak appears to be engaging in what Sinfield 
has termed the “‘entrapment model’ of ideology and 
power, whereby even, or especially, maneuvers that 
seem designed to challenge the system help to 
maintain it” (Sinfield, 750). Further appearing to be 
engaged with the “entrapment model”, Spivak states 
that,
Attempts to construct the “Third World Woman” as a 
signifier remind us that the hegemonic definition of 
literature is itself caught within the histor y of 
imperialism. A full literary reinscription cannot easily 
flourish in the imperialist fracture or discontinuity, 
covered over by an alien legal system masquerading 
as Law as such, an alien ideology established as the 
only Truth, and a set of human sciences busy 
establishing the “native” as self-consolidating Other. 
(254) 
Here Spivak emphasizes the difficulty, though not 
the impossibility, for literature and literar y 
interpretation to challenge dominant ideologies. 
She used the phrase “cannot easily flourish” rather 
than “is completely impossible.” For Spivak and 
Sinfield, literature has the same potential to 
emancipate, but for Spivak the challenge in doing 
so is greater.           
In the context of her discussion of Mary Shelley’s 
purposes in writing Frankenstein, Spivak comments 
on how even if it was not the author’s intention to 
offer a critique of colonialism, the fact that such a 
r e a d i n g  i s  p o s s i b l e — t h a t ,  f o r  e x a m p l e , 
Frankenstein’s friend Cler val’s wish to learn 
languages of the Orient for the purpose of extending 
the British Empire—gives insight into the colonial 
mentality that Frankenstein reveals even if such 
insights were not on Mary Shelley’s mind when she 
was writing Frankenstein (256).
Spivak signals the intention to interpret Shelley in the 
direction of Spivak’s own choosing by acknowledging 
both Barbara Johnson’s work on Frankenstein as 
feminist autobiography and George Levine’s 
reading of Frankenstein as a book that is concerned 
with the creat ive process of  writ ing.  After 
referencing Johnson and Levine, Spivak declares,
I propose to take Frankenstein out of this arena and 
focus on it in terms of that sense of English cultural 
identity which I invoked at the opening of this 
[Spivak’s] essay. Within that focus we are obliged to 
admit that, although Frankenstein is ostensibly about 
the origin and evolution of man in society, it does not 
deploy the axiomatics of imperialism. (254)
Spivak later adds,
In this overly didactic text, Shelley’s point is that 
social engineering should not be based on pure, 
theoretical, or natural-scientific reason alone, which 
is her implicit critique of the utilitarian vision of an 
engineered society. To this end, she presents in the 
first part of her deliberately schematic story three 
characters, childhood friends, who seem to represent 
Kant’s three-part conception of the human subject: 
Victor Frankenstein, the forces of theoretical reason 
or “natural philosophy”; Henry Clerval, the forces of 
practical reason or “the moral relations of things”; 
and Elizabeth Lavenza, that aesthetic judgment-“the 
aerial creation of the poets”-which, according to 
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Kant, is “a suitable mediating link connecting the 
realm of the concept of nature and that of the concept 
of freedom ... (which) promotes ... moral feeling”. 
(256) 
In effect, Spivak is here arguing that Frankenstein 
provides a structural critique of imperialism that 
Jane Eyre lacks. 
In considering the way a work may be interpreted 
and the autonomy readers have to interpret works 
in ways the original creator may not have intended, 
Spivak reflects,
I should hasten to add here that just as readings 
such as this one do not necessarily accuse Charlotte 
Brontë the named individual of harboring imperialist 
sentiments, so also they do not necessarily commend 
Mary Shelley the named individual for writing a 
successful Kantian allegory. The most I can say is 
that it is possible to read these texts, within the 
frame of imperialism and the Kantian ethical 
moment, in a politically useful way. (257) 
Spivak’s conclusion in the above paragraph is 
significant. If it is possible to read fiction within the 
context of the prevailing ideology in which it was 
created [imperialism and the Kantian ethical 
moment in the case of Frankenstein] “in a politically 
useful way”, one obvious use is in seeking to 
redress revealed injustices. It is possible to 
challenge “established tradition”, “human nature”, 
“family values” and other conservative labels as 
having been created within other “isms” and ethical 
moments. 
In her brief look at Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, 
Spivak stresses that the savage Other—the 
monster—may be interpreted as Caliban in The 
Tempest  and Othello in Othello .  Speaking of 
Frankenstein’s creation, Spivak says,
This Caliban’s education in (universal secular) 
humanity takes place through the monster’s 
eavesdropping on the instruction of an Ariel-Safie, 
the Christianized “Arabian” to whom “a residence in 
Turkey was abhorrent”. In depicting Safie, Shelley 
uses some commonplaces of eighteenth-centur y 
liberalism that are shared by many today: Safie’s 
Muslim father was a victim of (bad) Christian 
religious prejudice and yet was himself a wily and 
ungrateful man not as morally refined as her (good) 
Christian mother. Having tasted the emancipation of 
woman, Safie could not go home. The confusion 
between “Turk” and “Arab” has its counterpart in 
present-day confusion about Turkey and Iran as 
“Middle Eastern” but not “Arab”. (257) 
In the context of this paper, it is revealing that 
Spivak’s observation made roughly three and a half 
decades ago still has relevance to the Western 
media’s willingness to generalize about the “Arab 
World”. Interpretation of literary texts to reveal 
political attitudes, which may be compared to 
current political attitudes [in Spivak’s example, 
“commonplaces of eighteenth-century liberalism 
that  are shared by many today”],  requires 
knowledge of cur rent political attitudes [ie. 
familiarity and critical engagement with current 
events and world news].
Returning to the Kantian imperative that has 
been “travestied in the service of the state” (248) 
and that Spivak has earlier referred to as “soul 
making beyond ‘mere’ sexual reproduction” (248), 
Spivak concludes her remarks on Frankenstein by 
highlighting its ongoing tension on this subject. 
“The very relationship between sexual reproduction 
and social subject-production—the dynamic 
n ine teenth -centur y  topos  o f  f emin ism- in -
imperialism—remains problematic within the limits 
of Shelley’s text and, paradoxically, constitutes its 
strength” (259).
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Finally, in addressing and allowing another 
tension to stand unresolved, Spivak concludes, 
I must myself close with an idea that I cannot 
establish within the limits of this essay. … Earlier I 
contended that Wide Sargasso Sea is necessarily 
bound by the reach of the European novel. I 
suggested that, in contradistinction, to reopen the 
ep is temic  f rac tur e  o f  imper ia l i sm wi thout 
succumbing to a nostalgia for lost origins, the critic 
must turn to the archives of imperialist governance. 
(259) 
Here Spivak is presenting what we consider to be 
a historical materialist position. The records of 
imperialist governance are the material conditions 
of existence under which colonial peoples were 
ruled. Spivak is aware of the monumental task in 
documenting the injustices, of both an individual 
and cultural nature, that took place in the name of 
civilizing “savage” peoples. She is also aware that 
the urge to somehow return colonized people to the 
time before the colonization took place [a Common 
Law principle of restitution in which the victim is 
returned to the position she or he would have been 
in prior to the injury] is fanciful—a nostalgia for lost 
origins—and that archival evidence will provide the 
best insight into the injustices that must be 
redressed by renewing the dialogue on the damages 
caused by imperialism [reopening the epistemic 
fracture of imperialism].
In closing with an idea she is unable to establish, 
Spivak is also highlighting the benefit of allowing 
unresolved tensions to stand; namely,  that 
unsettled/reopened matters are sites for dialogue 
and discussion—they are occasions for critical 
thinking, for discursive interpretation. 
　3.3　 On Making Space for Discursive 
Interpretation
Sinfield’s interpretation of Othello and a number 
of other Shakespearian plays is a means for both 
critiquing post-modernism and for advancing the 
case for historical materialism. Sinfield contends 
that the New Historicism is a postmodern position 
that wants to say everything is a story in its own 
context—he uses the phrase ‘it’s all a play’—and he 
also critiques what he terms the “entrapment 
method” that he feels the new historicism uses to 
say that either the space for dissent is so small that 
dissent is always squeezed out by, or rather 
absorbed into, the dominant view and that dissent 
actually strengthens the dominant view by alerting 
its leaders to weaknesses in the system, which can 
then be accommodated or eradicated.
Sinfield’s reply to the can’t-win-no-matter-what 
assertions of the “entrapment method” is to modify 
the notion of winning. Sinfield notes that the mere 
acknowledgement of dissent by the dominant group 
makes space for marginalized groups to respond. 
Moreover, the response may move far beyond the 
boundaries that the dominant groups sets in their 
attempt to contain dissent.  Here,  the need 
dissenting groups have for a wider range of 
information than that which the dominant group 
provides—the need to have facts with which to 
challenge the “official story”—supports the thesis 
that knowledge of world news and international 
events leads to the development of an internationalist 
perspective. 
Spivak, in examining imperialism through the 
interpretation of three literary works, begins with 
an examination of the small spaces that Jane 
describes at the beginning of Jane Eyre. Spivak finds 
it telling that Jane is not even provided with a voice 
to end the novel. 
At the novel’s end, the allegorical language of 
Christian psychobiography—rather than the 
textually constituted and seemingly private grammar 
of the creative imagination which we noted in the 
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novel’s opening—marks the inaccessibility of the 
imperialist project as such to the nascent “feminist” 
scenario”. (249)
In interpreting Jean Rhys’ Wide Sargasso Sea as a 
reframing of Jane Eyre in giving space for one of the 
marginal ized colonized characters,  Spivak 
comments on how “Rhys sees to it that the woman 
from the colonies is not sacrificed as an insane 
animal for her sister’s consolidation” (251). 
Reflecting on Spivak’s comment that “one may 
interpret a work in a way the original creator may 
not have intended” and that “the most I can say is 
that it is possible to read these texts, within the 
frame of imperialism and the Kantian ethical 
moment, in a politically useful way (257)”, which 
has been discussed above, and in consideration of 
interpretation of literary works as a way of making 
of space for wider social issues to emerge, we now 
return to Jean Rhys’ Wide Sargasso Sea and 
consider this stretch of ocean as a metaphor for a 
physical space turned into a psychological place. It’s 
a metaphor Rhys may well have intended. Spivak 
failed to mention the use of the Sargasso Sea as the 
“place” Rhys chose for the title of the novel. A quick 
Internet search reveals the following description of 
the Sargasso Sea.
Although the ubiquitous seaweed might lead one to 
suppose the [Sargasso] Sea to be an unusually fertile 
stretch of ocean—a marine jungle, as it were—its 
warm, still waters have actually long been considered 
something of a deser t in biological terms, with 
relatively little life (except for the seaweed, of 
course). Like many deserts, though, it does harbor 
its own unique ecosystem, with organisms that are 
specially adapted to live among the Sargassum mats, 
and biologists have more recently begun to 




These three points: i) the supposition of a fertile 
ground to be exploited, ii) the perception that leads 
to devaluation—like a biological desert—allowing 
the rationale for colonization, that the Other may be 
savages to be civilized rather than “its own unique 
ecosystem”, and iii) finally, the appreciation of “a 
haven of biodiversity”, may be interpreted as a 
metaphor for colonial and post-colonial thinking. 
While these reflections may in some ways seem a 
divergence from the critique of Spivak, they also 
illustrate Spivak’s point that literary interpretation 
has the potential to introduce novel and possibly 
insightful enhancements to the primary work under 
consideration and to subsequent critiques of the 
work.  
To provide space for what Spivak terms nascent 
feminism, Frankenstein  employs a framing 
technique where we hear the story being told to the 
sister of the ship’s captain from his perspective, 
then from Dr. Frankenstein’s perspective, and then 
from his creature’s perspective. Spivak comments,
Earlier, I offered a reading of woman as womb holder 
in Frankenstein. I would now suggest that there is a 
framing woman in the book who is neither tangential, 
nor encircled, nor yet encircling. “Mrs. Saville”, 
“excellent Margaret”, “beloved Sister” are her 
address and kinship inscriptions. She is the occasion, 
though not the protagonist, of the novel. She is the 
feminine subject rather than the female individualist: 
she is the irreducible recipient-function of the letters 
that constitute Frankenstein. (259) 
Possibly to open a space for debating the merits/
dangers of  l i teral  [as  opposed to l i terar y] 
interpretation, which speaks to the need to question 
fundamentalist interpretations of other religious 
texts, Shelley has Frankenstein’s monster recall to 
his creator, “Paradise Lost excited different and far 
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deeper emotions. I read it, as I had read the other 
volumes which had fallen into my hands, as a true 
history” (Kindle Loc. 1605-6). 
　Part 4:　Conclusions 
This part of our paper advanced the position that 
we learn historical and present day realities from 
literature [novels and poems as well as dramatic 
works, plays, ballet, opera] in as valid a way as we 
learn from the chronicles that historians write. This 
is because we get a feel for the issues that truly 
matter to people. Sinfield makes this point more 
strongly than Spivak, but Spivak would likely agree 
with Sinfield on this issue. Official histories are tied 
to ideological agendas. The claim can be made [and 
is well-suppor ted in both Spivak and Sinfield’s 
interpretation of literary works] that plays and other 
literar y works also have an ideological and a 
political agenda that is as normative as it is 
descriptive; with its most ef fective form being 
normative precisely because it is so accurately 
descriptive. However, the reader or theater patron 
is also aware the work was written or is being 
staged for the purpose of being entertaining. This 
awareness supports the view and may reasonably 
be taken to mean that the reader or viewer 
understands it is just one variation, one take, on the 
history of the time and, therefore, the reader or 
viewer is more critical than they may be reading 
what claims to be a factual account/history of the 
past. Literature, poetr y and prose, as well as 
dramatic works of theater, ballet, and opera 
a c c o m m o d a t e  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  d i f f e r e n t 
interpretations because there is more “ar tistic 
license” for the presentation of selections and 
interpretations that further expand on the original 
creator’s dramatic purposes.
As a one-step-removed process, Spivak and 
Sinfield’s claims that social justice issues may be 
understood through literary interpretation seem to 
offer ways of speaking about issues of colonization 
and discrimination without actually presuming to 
speak for individuals who have suffered or currently 
suffer from such injustices. This poses an important 
question. How much does the process of looking at 
something serve to change what one is looking at? 
In one sense it may be contended that the subject is 
not altered, only that the observer’s perceptions of 
the subject are altered by the ideological lens 
thr ough  which  one  v iews  the  scene—the 
preconceptions one brings to the act of observation 
[remembering that all acts of observation are also 
cases in which the observer is making a selection].  
This poses a social justice dilemma. One feels 
compelled to speak out against conditions of 
inequality and social injustice while also being 
mindful that speaking on behalf of others may be 
presumptuous and damaging. Further, those on 
whose behalf one wishes to speak may justly resent 
being spoken for and demand the right to speak on 
their own behalves. How many progressive-minded 
individuals agonize on whether their involvement 
actually worsens conditions for those they wish to 
aid versus whether their lack of involvement is an 
abdication of responsibility for bettering the world 
and supporting those less well off? 
One possible balm to this anguish may be in 
Sinfield’s contention that the material conditions of 
a society are a major determining factor in how 
people organize themselves. Reinforcing his point 
regarding the inevitability of emerging awareness 
and confrontation, Sinfield asserts that
scope for dissident understanding and action occurs 
not because women characters, Shakespeare, and 
feminist readers have a privileged vantage point 
outside the dominant, but because the social order 
cannot but produce faultlines through which its own 
criteria of plausibility fall into contest and disarray. 
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(755)
Spivak may disagree with Sinfield’s sentiment 
that there may never exist “a privileged vantage 
point outside the dominant” (755) and contend, 
instead, that careful deconstruction of elements that 
are open to interpretation in a work—for example, 
that “the progress of Jane Eyre can be charted 
through a sequential arrangement of the family/
counter-family dyad” (246)—does truly amount to a 
vantage point outside the dominant.
Spivak is more self-conscious and proceeds using 
a deconstructionist style of literary interpretation. 
Both Spivak and Sinfield’s styles of literary criticism 
are useful methods of inquiry into the humanities. 
Additionally, both are useful tools in conducting 
r e s e a r c h  i n t o  w a y s  o n e  m a y  d e v e l o p  a n 
internationalist point of view by attempting to see 
the world from the perspective of the other 
[whether this other is the capital “Other” Spivak 
refers to in individual terms [, which explains 
Spivak’s use of other as a proper noun,] or the 
group/milieu Sinfield sees as the necessary unit of 
measurement for social action in a Mar xist 
historical materialist definition.
Both methods of interpretation enable us to 
identify inequalities as sources of injustice. This 
identification is necessar y for the purposes of 
remedying this condition and the commencement 
of this remedy begins with the attempt to correct 
racist, sexist, colonial interpretations of history. 
This action is a step toward diminishing inequalities 
globally. Sinfield’s notion of plausibility carries with 
it the understanding that what may have been 
plausible to Elizabethan audiences—the inferiority 
of people of color—is certainly not plausible in 
today’s world. In this sense, plausibility is a 
developmental notion. Historical materialism and 
the faultlines that allow for meaningful dissent 
beyond the “entrapment model” pooh-poohing its 
possibility all suppor t the dynamic nature of 
Sinfield’s model. 
In closing, we revisit our nautical metaphor and 
liken lateral reasoning to scanning the horizon; 
vertical reasoning may be thought of as sounding 
the depths. Both are necessary. Analysis of relevant 
data—critical thinking—is required in each activity. 
The first part of this paper, while appraising the 
merits of four views on judging art and three about 
judging history, may be thought of as akin to a 
literature review. The movement to ver tical 
reasoning involves tilting one’s focus [the up and 
down side-to-side roll or front to back yaw, in 
nautical or aeronautical terminology] toward deeper 
examination. We selected two works of literary 
criticism that dealt with artistic works of historical 
significance from the literary canon. They display 
the sustained concentration of a thesis. Their focus 
on issues of identity, racism, feminism, and 
imperialism—offering close textual analysis and 
multilayered evaluation—demonstrates the simple 
truth that critical thinking must be about engaging 
with issues of critical importance. The paradox is 
that even seemingly superficial concerns, when 
rigorously critiqued, may reveal matters of 
significant consequence. Ultimately, and practically 
speaking, textual analysis constitutes the bulk of the 
work scholars  per for m.  We tr ust  that  our 
consideration of a selection of outlines for judging 
art and history and the in-depth literary analysis in 
this paper, which we describe as a voyage of critical 
thinking from lateral to vertical reasoning, may be 
useful and thought-provoking to learners at all 
levels.          
* This paper was written in the main by Lawrence 
Karn, with the very kind assistance and support 
of Takahiko Hattori.
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